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COMPUTER ASSOCIATES INTERNATIONAL v.
ALTA, INC.:* PROTECTING THE STRUCTURE OF
COMPUTER SOFTWARE IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT
INTRODUCTION
Copyright protection for computers, like the evolving tech-
nology of computers itself, is in a state of flux. Although Con-
gress decided in 1980 that computer software should be pro-
tected by copyright law instead of patent law,' the propriety of
that decision is still being questioned by courts and commenta-
tors.' The Second Circuit recently narrowed the scope of com-
puter software copyright protection in Computer Associates In-
ternational v. Altai, Inc.3 While this decision may restrain the
growth of copyright as a barrier to the reuse of software, it
fails to provide critically needed, specific guidance in the evi-
dentiary analysis of copyright infringement in computer pro-
gram structure.
Computer programs are implicitly included in copyright-
able subject matter,4 and courts have had little or no trouble
granting copyright protection to what commonly have been
referred to as the "literal" elements of computer software.5
982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
See FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL
USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS (1978), reprinted in 5 COPYRIGHT, CONGRESS AND
TECHNOLOGY: THE PUBLIC RECORD (Nicholas Henry ed. 1980) [hereinafter CONTU
FINAL REPORT]. Patent law protects ideas or processes while copyright law protects
only the particular expression of an idea. Patent law protection is more extensive
in scope and, therefore, entails a more rigorous examination process and provides
a shorter duration of protection than copyright.
2 See Bradford P. Lyerla, Copyrightability of Software User Interfaces: The
Natural Law Versus the Social Utilitarian Approach, COMPUTER LAW., Jan. 1993,
at 21 (comparing the views of those approving of copyright protection for software
with those abhorring it); Marc T. Kretschmer, Copyright Protection for Software
Architecture: Just Say No!, 1988 COLUmi. Bus. L. REV. 823 (advocating reliance on
carefully restricted access to software production in conjunction with trade secret
law protection).
982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
Computer programs are treated as "literary works" under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)
(1977). H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1976).
' See Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983),
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Literal elements include the sequence of computer instructions
that are actually "written" by the programmer and fixed in a
form readable by either people or computers. Thus, such
"writings" can easily be viewed as "original works of author-
ship fixed in [a) tangible medium" as required for protection
under the Copyright Act of 1976.6
On the other hand, courts have wrestled with the
copyrightability of so-called "nonliteral" elements of computer
software. Nonliteral elements include the organization, struc-
tures and dynamic sequences of a "running" program.7 While
nonliteral elements of traditionally copyrightable material are
protectible, courts must always face the difficult question of
where to mark the boundary between unprotectible "ideas" and
the protectible "expression" of an idea.8 This problem is com-
pounded when applied to computer software for two reasons.
First, the nonliteral "expressions" (specifically, the structures)
of a computer program are not easily seen or "felt" as may be
the nonliteral expressions of a play, for instance. Second, the
fact-finder typically has no computer training and, thus, has no
ability to identify these expressions or to determine whether
they are similar.
The Second Circuit addressed both of these problems in
Computer Associates. Initially, the court created a three-part
test that can be applied to any software to determine whether
its structure is protectible s Next, in addition to considering
the testimony of expert witnesses brought forth by the parties,
the court appointed its own expert witness to guide it through
the intricacies of computer software design and to render sig-
nificant aid in deciding the substantial similarity issue.
The Second Circuit's three-part test is cognizant of the
realities of computer programming. Yet the court failed to offer
useful guidance to its application in future cases. Further, the
court accepted that expert testimony is necessary in any com-
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); Williams Elecs. v. Artic Int'l, 685 F.2d 870 (3d
Cir. 1982); CMS Software Design Sys. v. Info Designs, 785 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir.
1986).
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1992).
A computer program that is in operation is said to be "running."
" See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) (Hand,
J.) (discussing this distinction).
Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706-11 (2d Cir. 1992).
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puter software litigation because the fact-finders typically have
no experience in the field. In doing so, however, the Second
Circuit dangerously allowed a court-appointed expert's testimo-
ny to cross the boundary between assisting the fact-finder and
creating law.
Part I of this Comment describes the basic computer soft-
ware concepts necessary to an understanding of the underlying
material, and surveys the development of copyright law as it
applies to software. Part II next explores the Computer Associ-
ates opinions of the district court and Second Circuit. Part III
then analyzes the "literal" and "nonliteral" distinction, elabo-
rates on the concept of computer program structure and exam-
ines the Second Circuit's test for substantial similarity of pro-
gram structure, and considers the extent to and manner in
which expert testimony should enter the analysis. Finally, this
Comment suggests how courts should explain their reasoning
in computer software cases in order to improve the clarity and
precedential value of their decisions.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Basic Computer Concepts
"Computer programs" are defined in the Copyright Act of
1976 as "set[s] of statements or instructions to be used directly
or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain
result."" These instructions are actually "written" by a com-
puter programmer, who understands a language of special
words and symbols that can be reduced to a format intelligible
to a computer. Computer programs are called "software' be-
cause they are malleable: a programmer can easily change a
set of instructions to the computer simply by editing what has
been written.
The computer itself, as that term is used in the Copyright
Act, is considered "hardware." Hardware consists of the physi-
cal electronic circuits in which the processing ordered by the
instructions occurs. The term "hardware" is appropriate since
these components are relatively fixed: a program can order the
circuits to perform certain predefined functions, but the config-
10 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. I 1993) (amending 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976)).
1993]
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uration in which the circuits are arranged inside the computer
is set during the manufacturing of the computer and cannot
easily be altered thereafter.
Computers only understand instructions that are repre-
sented as sequences of the binary digits zero and one. Writing
a program as an endless sequence of binary numbers would be
impossible, however, so programs are ordinarily written in one
of many programming languages understandable by hu-
mans." A program in this form is known as the "source code."
Once a program is completely written, it must be translated to
be understood by the computer. A computer program known as
a "compiler" translates the source code into a form known as
the "object code," the computer-legible sequences of zeroes and
ones. Hence, two entirely different collections of symbols which
specify exactly the same set of instructions exist for each pro-
gram: the source code for the programmer and the object code
for the computer. 2
Computer hardware is complex and can be difficult to
coordinate. Disk drives, monitors, keyboards and memory all
require special sequences of instructions to make them run
correctly and efficiently. 3 To control the hardware directly, a
programmer needs to know about every component of the sys-
tem to a level of detail nearly approaching the configuration of
all the millions of electronic circuits. To ease the burden on
11 Like human languages, a programming language possesses both a vocabulary
(a fixed set of instructions represented by sequences of letters or symbols) and a
grammar (a set of rules for combining the elements of the vocabulary). The vocab-
ularies of these languages are typically sets of abbreviations or mnemonics for
words or phrases of a human language.
12 There may, in fact, be more than two collections of symbols for a given
program. Some compilers accomplish the transformation from source to object codes
in more than one step and generate temporary translations in intermediary lan-
guages. Because both source and object codes are widely held to be copyrightable,
see infra note 28 and accompanying text, it is likely that these intermediate trans-
lations are also copyrightable.
" Although both are technically forms of memory, a "disk drive" typically re-
fers to a permanent storage device while "memory" usually refers to temporary
storage (e.g., Random Access Memory, or RAM). The object code of a computer
program is held in permanent storage; when it is run, it is copied into temporary
storage where the computer can actually read the program and process data.
Because a computer program must be copied from one storage medium to an-
other in order to function, the Copyright Act of 1976 was amended in 1980 to
exclude this form of copying from constituting infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 117(1),
amended by Pub. L. 96-517, § 10(b), 94 Stat. 3028 (1980).
[Vol. 59: 423
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programmers, and to maximize the efficient use of the
computer's hardware resources, a special program known as an
"operating system" is present in most computer systems. An
operating system is a sort of "command program:" it manages
and efficiently distributes the hardware resources of a comput-
er (permanent and temporary memory, access to various pro-
cessing units, etc.) to all of the other programs that are run-
ning. In addition, programmers creating applications for a
computer can write their software to meet the specifications of
the operating system, which is far easier than writing to meet
the more complex specifications of the hardware of the comput-
er itself.14 An operating system thus "hides" the most difficult
chores from the application programmer. Yet each operating
system generally has its own unique set of specifications that
an application program must meet. Thus, a program is written
to run only on a specific computer machine, and in conjunction
with a specific operating system. Software created for one
combination of hardware and operating system typically will
not function with a different combination."
B. The Development of Copyright Law for Computer Software
The Copyright Act of 1976 gives authors the exclusive
rights to reproduce, distribute, display and perform their
works, as well as the right to prepare derivative works based
on their copyrighted works." These rights endure for the life
of the author and fifty years after the author's death. Copy-
right protection is limited to "original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression."18 Copyright pro-
tects only the expression of ideas; it does not extend to ideas,
" An application is a program intended to be operated by a user and not
another programmer. That is, it is meant to be of use to people who wish to take
advantage of the capabilities of a computer without having to know in detail how
the computer works. A common example of an application program is a word pro-
cessor.
" Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 698-99 (2d Cir. 1992).
1G 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1992).
17 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1992).
" 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1992). The tangible medium of expression may be "now
known or later developed, from which [the work] can be perceived, reproduced, or




procedures, processes or methods, which can be protected only
by patent law.19
Although the Copyright Office has permitted authors to
register computer programs since 1964,20 doubt as to the va-
lidity of protection for computer programs under the Copyright
Act of 1909 prompted Congress in 1974 to create the National
Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works
("CONTU") to study copyright issues of computer programs
and photocopying.21
In 1978, CONTU issued its final report to Congress. A
majority of its Commissioners recommended that computer
programs remain copyrightable and proposed an amendment to
the recently adopted Copyright Act of 1976 that would include
a definition of computer programs22 and a section limiting the
exclusive rights of authors of computer programs where copies
must be made to use the program or for archival purposes.23
Congress amended the Copyright Act in 1980, accepting virtu-
ally all of CONTU's recommendations.24
The Copyright Act of 1976' defines eight categories of
materials regarded as "works of authorship," each of which is
entitled to copyright protection.26 Despite the explicit defini-
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1992).
20 Copyright Office Circular 31D (Jan. 1965).
21 Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88 Stat. 1873 (1974) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 104 (1988)).
22 "A 'computer program' is a set of statements or instructions to be used di-
rectly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result."
CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 30.
1 Id. All computer programs must be copied from permanent memory into
working memory before they can be run. If such a use were infringement, comput-
er programs could never legally be used. See supra note 13.
24 Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (1980) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-
117 (1988)). Section 101 of the Copyright Act was amended to include the defini-
tion of a computer program, and section 117, concerning the limitation of exclusive
rights of computer programs, was replaced. The only modification to CONTU's
recommendations for statutory change was to substitute the word "owner" for
CONTU's "rightful possessor" in describing who can make copies of a computer
program for use or for archival purposes. See 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1977 & Supp. I
1989).
25 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
28 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) provides:
Works of authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
[Vol. 59: 423
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tion of computer programs in the Act and the express limita-
tion on certain rights in computer programs, none of these
eight categories explicitly embraces computer software. Con-
gress, however, intended to include computer programs in the
category of "literary works."27 Consequently, literal aspects of
computer software, including the sequences of instructions that
comprise the source and object codes of a computer program,
have been afforded copyright protection without controversy.28
In addition, flowcharts documenting the general sequence of
operations in a computer program also may be afforded copy-
right protection as long as they are sufficiently original and de-
tailed.
While Congress and the courts have accepted the
copyrightability of the literal portions of computer software,
controversy has arisen concerning copyright of the "nonliteral"
aspects of computer software. Nonliteral elements are not as
easily defined or recognized as the literal source and object
codes. Nonliteral elements have been said to include the "struc-
ture" of computer software as well as certain results of a run-
ning program, such as a particular screen display." Copyright
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings; and
(8) architectural works.
Id.
27 H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1976). "The term 'literary
works' . . . includes . . . computer programs to the extent that they incorporate
authorship in the programmer's expression of original ideas, as distinguished from
the ideas themselves." Id.
2 CMS Software Design Sys., Inc. v. Info Designs, Inc., 785 F.2d 1246, 1249
(5th Cir. 1986) (source code copyrightable); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Com-
puter Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984)
(source and object code copyrightable); Digital Communications Assocs. v. Softklone
Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449, 454 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (source and object code
copyrightable).
2 A flowchart is a diagram which serves as a roadmap to the programmer.
After the general design of the program is agreed upon, it is often reduced to a
written flowchart which specifies the sequence and relation of the medium-scale
operations of the program. These operations are then fleshed out by the program-
mer into the hundreds of program instructions required to implement them. "Flow
charts, source codes, and object codes are works of authorship in which copyright
subsists, provided they are the product of sufficient intellectual labor to surpass
the 'insufficient intellectual labor hurdle' . . . ." CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note
1, at 54.
" See Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1239 (3d Cir.
1993]
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infringement of nonliteral elements of computer programs is
problematic both because of the dispute as to their
copyrightability, which turns on whether the elements are
ideas or expressions, and the difficulty in ascertaining whether
copying actually occurred. In a controversial case, the Third
Circuit addressed both of these issues.31
Generally, a suit for copyright infringement may be main-
tained when one of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner,
as elaborated in sections 106 through 118 of the Copyright Act,
has been violated. To prevail in such a suit, a plaintiff must
hold a valid copyright and must prove that the defendant cop-
ied the copyrighted work.33 Most litigation centers on whether
copying occurred.
To establish "copying" of the type necessary to prove copy-
right infringement, the defendant must have actually copied
from the plaintiffs copyrighted work, and the copying must go
"so far as to constitute improper appropriation."34 The plain-
tiff may prove copying through direct evidence (e.g., an admis-
sion of copying by the defendant) or circumstantial evidence.35
Since direct evidence is often unavailable, plaintiffs typically
attempt to prove copying by showing (1) that the defendant
had access to the copyrighted work and (2) that the defendant's
work is "substantially similar" to that of the plaintiff."
Traditionally under the substantial similarity test, the two
issues of whether "copying" has occurred and whether such
copying is illicit have been distinct and have been governed by
different evidentiary rules.37  When determining whether
1986) (providing copyright protection to a program's structure), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1031 (1987); Stern Elects., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 856 (2d Cir. 1982)
(copyrightability of a screen display independent of the underlying program's
copyrightability).
31 Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1222.
32 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1992).
" See Miller v. Universal City Studios, 650 F.2d 1365, 1375 (5th Cir. 1981);
Novelty Textile Mills v. Joan Fabrics, 558 F.2d 1090, 1092 (2d Cir. 1977).
" Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 472-73 (2d Cir. 1946) (holding that some
copying may not be illicit, and only that which "wrongly appropriate[s] something
which belongs to the plaintiff" is actionable), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 851 (1947).
35 Id.
3" Id.; see also Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222,
1231-32 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); Sid & Marty Krofft
Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1977).
" See, e.g., Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468-74.
[Vol. 59: 423
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"copying" has occurred, an analysis of the subject matter of the
works is relevant, and both expert and lay testimony are ad-
missible." This is called the "extrinsic" test of substantial
similarity. After establishing copying, the analysis then turns
to whether an "ordinary lay hearer" believes such copying was
illicit; expert testimony is inadmissible on this point.3 1 This is
the "intrinsic" test of substantial similarity.
When faced with a copyright litigation involving computer
software and other complex subject matter, the Third Circuit,
in Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc.,"' com-
bined the two issues of determining whether copying occurred
and whether it was illicit into a single "substantial similarity"
inquiry.4 The court found that "the ordinary observer test...
which does not permit expert testimony, is of doubtful value in
cases involving computer programs on account of the programs'
complexity and unfamiliarity to most members of the pub-
lic."42 Further, the court felt that the bifurcated approach is
ineffective because the finders of fact can hear expert testimo-
ny on copying that they must later "forget" in deciding the
closely related issue of its illicitness."
In considering the copyrightability of nonliteral elements
of computer software, the Third Circuit distinguished ideas
from expression in software by holding that "the purpose or
function of a utilitarian work would be the work's idea, and
everything that is not necessary to that purpose or function
would be part of the expression of the idea."" Thus, every
computer program has just one "idea," its primary purpose,
and everything surrounding this idea would be copyrightable,
as long as it "could be accomplished in a number of different
ways."45 In so narrowly defining a program's idea and in de-
"' Id. at 468-69.
39 Id.
" 797 F.2d at 1222.
" Id. at 1232-33.
42 Id. at 1232.
41 Id. at 1232-33. As the court wrote in Whelan, "Especially in complex cases,
we doubt that the 'forgetting' can be effective when the expert testimony is essen-
tial to even the most fundamental understanding of the objects in question." Id. at
1233.
" Id. at 1236.
4' Id. n.28. The Whelan reasoning has been applied specifically to protect
nonliteral screen displays. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740
19931
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parting from the traditional lay observer rule of expert testi-
mony, the Third Circuit broke new ground in computer soft-
ware copyright litigation. Accordingly, this area of copyright
law remained controversial when the Second Circuit decided
Computer Associates International v. Altai, Inc.
46
II. COMPUTER ASSOCIATES INTERiATIONAL V. ALTAI, INC.
A. The Facts
Computer Associates International, Inc. and Altai, Inc.
were both engaged in creating and marketing computer soft-
ware.41 One product offered by both companies was a job
scheduling program designed to run on IBM SystemI370 com-
puters.4" Job schedulers organize a set of tasks for a computer
and schedule them to run at times that most efficiently use the
computer's resources.49
At the time that the two companies were marketing their
job scheduling programs, the IBM System370 (the hardware
on which the programs must run) supported three different
operating systems." Computer Associates recognized that a
single program that could run on any of the three different
IBM Systemn370 operating systems would be far more market-
able than a program that was limited to a single operating
system.51 The creation of such a program is problematic, how-
ever, because much of the work in writing one version of the
program must be triplicated to enable the program to run on
F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990); Digital Communications Assoc. v. Softklone Dist.
Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
16 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
47 Id. at 698.
48 Id. at 698-99. The IBM System/370 is a family of computers designed for
use in medium-to-large sized businesses and educational institutions.
41 Id. at 698. For instance, a job scheduler might schedule a time-consuming
payroll program to be run at night when a company's employees are not using the
computer. Thus, the computer's resources can be dedicated exclusively to
employees' work during the day, and the normally unutilized nighttime resources
of the computer can be dedicated to the payroll program.
"0 Id. Competing operating systems are often sold by different vendors for the
same hardware platform, each purporting to offer superior speed, simplicity, etc.
"1 Computer Associates began development of its inter-operating system soft-




the two additional operating systems. Further, this triple bur-
den would accrue whenever any other program was to be writ-
ten for the IBM System370. Accordingly, any change in one
operating system would have to be reflected in the appropriate
section of each of the various programs that Computer Associ-
ates wrote for the SystemI370's other operating systems.
The Computer Associates solution was to isolate all of the
operating system-dependent computer code in one module,
which it called ADAPTER. 2 ADAPTER could be incorporated
into any program to allow compatibility with any of the Sys-
tem370 operating systems and any change in an operating
system would require only one change to ADAPTER. 3 Thus,
ADAPTER was an ingenious and valuable development which
made Computer Associates software more marketable through
its compatibility." It was simpler to use because customers no
longer needed to purchase a specific operating system or ver-
sion of the application program, and cheaper to maintain be-
cause any changes in an operating system could be made and
tested in one small piece of software.55
In 1982, Computer Associates began marketing its job
scheduler, called CA-SCHEDULER, which incorporated
ADAPTER. In the same year, Altai began to market its own
job scheduler program called ZEKE 6 ZEKE, like CA-SCHED-
ULER, ran on the IBM Systeml370. Unlike the universal com-
patibility offered by CA-SCHEDULER, however, ZEKE ran on
only one operating system. Responding to customer demand,
Altai decided to rewrite ZEKE in 1983 to run on at least one
additional operating system.
To accomplish this task, Altai's President, James P. Wil-
liams, a former Computer Associates employee, recruited a
friend of his, Claude F. Arney, III who still worked at Comput-
er Associates. Williams had not been involved in the develop-
ment of CA-SCHEDULER or ADAPTER, and did not know
that Arney was "intimately familiar with various aspects of
2 Computer Associates, 982 F.2d at 698.







ADAPTER.""8 In fact, in addition to his work on the ADAPT-
ER project, Arney had been permitted to take copies of
ADAPTER's source code home while he was employed at Com-
puter Associates. When he left to work for Altai in 1984, he
retained these copies in violation of his employment agreement
with Computer Associates. 9
Arney persuaded Williams that the best solution to provid-
ing increased operating system compatibility was to "introduce
a 'common system interface' component into ZEKE," which
they called OSCAR.6" Arney failed to mention that this idea
originated from his work on ADAPTER, and he never revealed
to anyone at Altai that he retained copies of ADAPTER's
source code which he used to design and develop OSCAR.61
After four months of work, OSCAR was complete; Arney had
copied approximately thirty percent of its source code from
ADAPTER.62 Altai incorporated a version called OSCAR 3.4
into several of its marketed products, including ZEKE, from
1985 to 1988.
Altai first learned of Arney's possible misappropriations
when it received service of process.63 Arney then confirmed to
Williams that the allegations of copying were true, and told
Williams which portions of OSCAR 3.4 were copied from
ADAPTER. Williams never saw the ADAPTER source code.6
After seeking legal counsel, Williams decided to rewrite the
offending sections of OSCAR 3.4 and exclude Arney entirely
from the process. Altai's programmers were given a "descrip-
tion of the ZEKE operating system services" to rewrite the
source code.65 The goal of the project was to save as much of
OSCAR 3.4 as legitimately possible while eliminating all por-
tions that had been copied from ADAPTER.66 After complet-
ing the rewrite, the new version, OSCAR 3.5, was sold to
8 d.
6' Id. at 699-700.
60 Id. at 700.
'1 Id.
62 Id. Altai conceded that approximately thirty percent of Oscar was copied
directly from the source code of Adapter. Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 775
F. Supp. 544, 560 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).






Altai's new customers, and old customers were provided with a
"free upgrade" of OSCAR 3.4 to OSCAR 3.5.67
In July of 1988, Computer Associates brought suit against
Altai in the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey, claiming that Altai had misappropriated its trade
secrets and infringed its copyright of CA-SCHEDULER in both
OSCAR 3.4 and the rewritten OSCAR 3.5.6 The parties stipu-
lated to transfer the case to the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York in March 1989.69
B. The District Court Decision
The court began its analysis by noting that the focus of the
inquiry is whether Altai's OSCAR programs infringed on Com-
puter Associates' ADAPTER program." To prove infringe-
ment, a plaintiff must demonstrate ownership of a valid copy-
right and that the defendant copied the plaintiffs copyrighted
work."1 The court decided that Computer Associates held a
valid copyright on ADAPTER even though it was not separate-
ly registered. Computer Associates was the undisputed author
of ADAPTER and, in fact, held a registered copyright on a ver-
sion of its job scheduler, CA-SCHEDULER 2.1, which con-
tained ADAPTER. The court found that separate registrations
of the sub-modules of a program are not required because
"dozens if not hundreds of [such] registrations" would be need-
ed. 2
Next, the court turned to the plaintiffs burden of proving
that the defendant copied the copyrighted work. In the case of
OSCAR 3.4, Altai conceded that Arney had copied approxi-
G7 Id.
'7 The trade secret claim is not addressed in this Comment. However, the
original, unreported holding by the Second Circuit that Computer Associates' state
law trade secret claims were preempted by section 301 of the Copyright Act was
partially reversed in the amended Second Circuit opinion. See Computer Assocs.
Int'l v. Altai, Inc., No. 762, 91-7893, 1992 WL 139364, at *24-27 (2d Cir. June 22,
1992) (original opinion prior to rehearing).
' Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 700.
7' Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544, 555 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
71 Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 701 (citing Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joan
Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090, 1092 (2d Cir. 1977)); see also Arnstein v. Porter, 154
F.2d 464, 468-74 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 851 (1947).
7 Computer Assocs., 775 F. Supp. at 556.
1993]
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mately thirty percent of the source code directly from ADAPT-
ER and, thus, admitted infringement.73 There was no direct
evidence of copying as to the rewritten OSCAR 3.5, however, so
the court addressed whether Computer Associates had proven
"'access and substantial similarity between the work... [and
that the] similarities relate to the copyrightable material."'7 4
The court assumed that Altai, through Arney's copies, did have
access to the source code of ADAPTER.
Thus, the question as to whether OSCAR 3.5 infringed
upon ADAPTER turned on whether the two programs were
substantially similar. The Third Circuit had enunciated its test
for substantial similarity in computer programs in Whelan
Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory.75 In Whelan a dental
laboratory program written in a computer language called EDL
was essentially rewritten by a competing company in the lan-
guage BASIC. The court held that "the purpose or function of a
utilitarian work would be the work's idea, and everything that
is not necessary to that purpose or function would be part of
the expression of the idea" and, therefore, protectible by copy-
right.76 Among the elements of expression that are therefore
protectible under the Whelan test are the "structure, sequence,
and organization" of a computer program.77 The district court
in Cbmputer Associates disregarded this test, calling it "inade-
quate and inaccurate."7" Bolstered by support from a court-
appointed expert and the renowned copyright academic Profes-
sor Nimmer, the court found that the Whelan test was flawed
for two basic reasons. First, it failed to address the notion that
a computer program can contain more than one idea. Under
Whelan, once the single idea that the program embodies is
identified, everything contained in the program that is not
necessary or incidental to that idea is considered protectible
expression.79 Second, Whelan failed to distinguish between
73 Id. at 560.
7' Id. at 557 (quoting Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 48 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986)).
75 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
76 Id. at 1236.
' Id. at 1248.
78 Computer Assocs. 775 F. Supp. at 559.
71 Id. For example, in Whelan, the court determined that the "idea" of the
plaintiffs program was "the efficient organization of a dental laboratory." 797 F.2d
at 1240. All of "the detailed expression of the . . . program is part of the expres-
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the static structure of a program (the text of its source code
and sequence of instructions in its object code) and the dynam-
ic structure of a program (the way the program "behaves"
when it is running and reacting to input). Because it failed to
make this distinction, the Whelan test synonymizes the terms
"structure," "sequence," and "organization" when in fact these
terms are not synonymous.80
Further, the Computer Associates court noted a possible
statutory problem when the dynamic "behavior" of a computer
program is recognized. Title 17 section 102(a) provides copy-
right protection in original works of authorship, including
computer programs. Section 102(b), however, provides: "In no
case does copyright protection for an original work of author-
ship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the
form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embod-
ied in such work."8" The court noted that the behavioral com-
ponent of a computer program is within the meaning of the
words "process," "system," and "method of operation," and that
the behavior of a computer program merits no copyright pro-
tection at all.82 The court ultimately did not reach this issue,
however, finding that the rights of Computer Associates would
be fully preserved by looking at only the static, non-behavioral
structure of the ADAPTER program: the text of its source
code.'
The court followed what it called the "abstractions" test in
determining whether the two programs were substantially
similar.' First proffered by Judge Learned Hand, the abstrac-
tions test holds:
sion, not the idea, of that program." Id. at 1239. Hence, the entire program was
protectible.
"o Computer Assocs., 775 F. Supp. at 560. Although the Second Circuit recog-
nized that these terms have different meanings, it, too, failed to define them prop-
erly. See infra part III.A.
81 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1992).
82 Computer Assocs., 775 F. Supp. at 560. The court noted the suggestion that
computer software might be better protected by patent law rather than copyright
law. Id.; see Randall M. Whitmeyer, Comment, A Plea For Due Processes: Defining
the Proper Scope of Patent Protection for Computer Software, 85 NW. U. L. REV.
1103, 1123-25 (1991).




Upon any work.., a great number of patterns of increasing gener-
ality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left
out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most general state-
ment of what the [work] is about and at times might consist only of
its title; but there is a point in this series of abstractions where they
are no longer protected, since otherwise the [author] could prevent
the use of his "ideas" to which, apart from their expression, his prop-
erty is never extended."
In determining how this test would be applied to computer
programs, the court relied heavily on the testimony of the
court-appointed expert Dr. Randall Davis of the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology's Artificial Intelligence Research Labo-
ratory."6 The analysis "would progress in order of 'increasing
generality' from object code, to source code, to parameter lists,
to services required, to general outline.""
After stratifying its analysis into these levels, the court,
again relying on Dr. Davis's testimony, found that any similar-
ities that existed in the two programs could be explained by:
(1) factors external to the program (like the calls which must
be made to the operating systems); (2) functional demands (the
program's "job"); (3) elements in the public domain; or (4) a
structure or method "simple and obvious to anyone exposed to
the operation of the program."8 Hence, OSCAR 3.5 was not
substantially similar to ADAPTER and Computer Associates'
claim of copyright infringement regarding OSCAR 3.5 failed.89
C. The Second Circuit Decision
On appeal Computer Associates contended that the district
court's method for determining substantial similarity between
ADAPTER and OSCAR 3.5 was in error." The Second Circuit
" Id. (quoting Nichols v. Universal Pictures, 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930)
(Hand, J.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931)).
" Dr. Davis composed a written report for the court on basic computer science
and varieties of computer software similarity. A revised and expanded version of
this report is reprinted in Randall Davis, The Nature of Software and its Conse-
quences for Establishing and Evaluating Substantial Similarity, 5 SOFTWARE L.J.
299 (1992).
'8 Computer Assocs., 775 F. Supp. at 560 (quoting Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121).
88 Id. at 562.
89 Id.
" Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 701 (2d Cir. 1992).
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adopted the district court's assumption that Altai had access to
Computer Associates' ADAPTER program and, like the district
court, narrowed its inquiry to whether the two programs were
substantially similar.9 Unlike the district court, however, the
Second Circuit immediately expanded its field of inquiry to
include not only the text of the two programs, but the "non-
literal components" of the programs as well. 92 It held that
"non-literal structures of computer programs are protected by
copyright."93 Finding that Altai's rewrite of OSCAR eliminat-
ed the substantial similarity of any "literal" elements of
ADAPTER, the court turned to Computer Associates' argument
that OSCAR 3.5's structure remained substantially similar to
that of ADAPTER.
The court reviewed the idea versus expression dichotomy
of copyright law, stressing the holding in Baker v. Selden94
that "those aspects of a work, which 'must necessarily be used
as incident to' the idea, system or process that the work de-
scribes, are also not copyrightable."95 After rejecting the Third
Circuit's test for substantial similarity of computer programs
articulated in Whelan" for much the same reasoning as the
district court,97 the Second Circuit went on to enunciate its
own test: "Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison."8
The abstraction-filtration-comparison test is quite similar
to the methodology applied in the district court's decision. The
first step of the tripartite test is to, "in a manner that resem-
bles reverse engineering ... dissect the allegedly copied
program's structure and isolate each level of abstraction con-
tained within it."99 Next, at each defined level of abstraction,
the structural components are examined "to determine whether
91 Id.
92 Id. ("It is of course essential to any protection of literary property ... that
the right cannot be limited literally to the text, else a plagiarist would escape by
immaterial variations.") (quoting Nichols v. Universal Pictures, 45 F.2d 119, 121
(2d Cir. 1930) (Hand, J.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931)).
" Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 702.
94 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
" Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 704 (quoting Baker, 101 U.S. at 104).
96 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
"' Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 705-06; see also supra notes 75-80 and accom-
panying text.
98 Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 706.
o Id. at 707.
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their particular inclusion at that level was 'idea' or was dictat-
ed by considerations of efficiency, so as to be necessarily inci-
dental to that idea; required by factors external to the program
itself; or taken from the public domain."' 0 Such components,
the court held, are non-protectible."'0 The remaining core of
expression left after filtration is subject to copyright protection
and is submitted to the third and final step of the analysis:
comparison. Here, "the court's substantial similarity inquiry
focuses on whether the defendant copied any aspect of this
protected expression, as well as an assessment of the copied
portion's relative importance with respect to plaintiffs overall
program."0 2
Noting that the district court's method of analysis "served
as a roadmap" for its own,'0 3 the Second Circuit affirmed the
district court's conclusion that OSCAR 3.5 was not substantial-
ly similar to ADAPTER, agreeing that any similar elements
were taken from the public domain or dictated by efficiency or
external factors.' 4
III. ANALYSIS
The application of copyright law to computer software has
caused a great deal of confusion in courts because most judges
do not understand computers and, therefore, are not able to
reason confidently how copyright law should apply to computer
software. Significantly, decisions often lack a specific, detailed
discussion of the computer code at issue in a case. This failing
is disturbing for two reasons. First, it may indicate that the
fact-finder does not fully comprehend the subject matter in the
particular case. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the
precedential value of the case as a tool in evidentiary analysis
is lost.
To foster an understanding for this technology and its
protection, it is imperative that judges and lawmakers alike
quash their apprehensions about software and begin to discuss
10 Id. These considerations were espoused by the district court. See supra note
88 and accompanying text.
"' Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 710.
102 Id.




it-in detail. It is troublesome that in many judicial decisions,
while the subject matter at issue is computer software, the
opinions omit any inclusion of portions of the computer code
under scrutiny or even a paraphrased discussion of how the
code functions. In the Computer Associates decisions there is
no specific discussion of any portion of the programs involved.
To protect computer software structure, it is necessary to
determine what the structure consists of and what evidence is
meaningful in determining whether it has been plagiarized. In
this vein, courts must abandon the misleading buzzphrases of
"literal" and "nonliteral" expression. Instead, they must be
prepared to scrutinize computer code closely to determine both
verbatim code similarity and structural similarity. Next, judges
will need a well-defined framework for determining substantial
similarity. The Computer Associates decisions offer some guid-
ance in this regard but not enough. Finally, experts must fill a
strictly monitored but important role in aiding the fact-finder
in technically detailed analysis.
A. Literal vs. Nonliteral: An Unhelpful Distinction
The pragmatic problem of a court's reliance solely on ex-
pert witness testimony, and the difficulties inherent in accord-
ing copyright protection to nonliteral computer program ele-
ments, are illustrated by the Second Circuit's difficulty in de-
fining and addressing nonliteral aspects of computer programs
and their relation to a finding of copyright infringement. In
Computer Associates, the court failed to give a complete, con-
cise definition of "nonliteral components," and in evaluating its
expert witness' testimony the court instead focused primarily
on literal components of computer programs.
Computer Associates claimed that Altai had infringed the
structure of the ADAPTER program. The court found that "a
program's structure includes its non-literal components such as
general flow charts as well as the more specific organization of
inter-modular relationships, parameter lists, and macros."" 5
This definition of nonliteral structures embraces the "struc-
ture, sequence, and organization" ("SSO") group of elements
that many other courts, including the Whelan court, have held
"s Id. at 702.
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to be protectible by copyright law. 10 6
The extent to which these elements of computer program
structure are nonliteral is unclear in the Second Circuit opin-
ion. The district court noted that its analysis focused on the
programs only as literal text. 10 7 In its substantial similarity
inquiry, the district court relied on Dr. Davis to quantify the
relative importance of each of five factors that could indicate
similarity between the two programs. Dr. Davis rated the im-





-List of Services 1
* Organization Chart Nil'08
Dr. Davis and, therefore, the district court found that there
was no similarity between OSCAR 3.5 and ADAPTER in the
code since OSCAR 3.4 had been rewritten to remove the simi-
lar code. Further, most of the parameter lists and macros in
ADAPTER were either in the public domain or dictated by the
functionality of the program and, thus, were not
protectible. °9 Finally, the list of services and organizational
chart combined could not alone provide sufficient evidence of
substantial similarity to prove infringement."' The Second
"o' See, e.g., Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173,
1175 (9th Cir. 1989) (protecting "the non-literal components of a program, includ-
ing the structure, sequence and organization"); Healthcare Affiliated Servs., Inc. v.
Lippany, 701 F. Supp. 1142, 1150 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (noting that copyright protects
the "so-called 'non-literal' aspects of [a computer] program, i.e., its structure, se-
quence and organization."); see also Meredith Corp. v.. Harper & Row Publishers,
Inc., 378 F. Supp. 686, 690 (S.D.N.Y.) (copyright protection extends to the "struc-
ture and topical sequence" in textbooks), affd, 500 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir. 1974).
1"7 Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 554, 560 (E.D.N.Y. 1991)
("[Computer Associates'] rights . . . are fully protected by viewing the ADAPTER
program as text.").
108 Id. at 562.
' Id. The district court found that "only a few of the lists and macros were
similar to protected elements in ADAPTER." Id. The Second Circuit held that the
district court could find that these few similarities did not constitute infringement
"given their relative contribution to the overall program." Computer Assocs. Int'l v.
Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 715 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing the de minimis exception in
Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos. 720 F.2d 231, 242 (2d Cir.
1983)).
"' Computer Assocs., 775 F. Supp. at 562.
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Circuit's review of the district court's analysis focused on this
table of relative importance and the finding that the relevant
evidence was insufficient to support a claim for infringement.
For its own analysis, the Second Circuit adopted the find-
ings of Dr. Davis and the district court, but in the context of
nonliteral components of computer software. However, the
district court's findings were restricted to the literal component
context. This semantic extension of the district court's reason-
ing is misleading because it confuses the distinction between a
computer program's code and its structure with a nebulous
distinction between so-called literal and nonliteral aspects of
software.' If courts are not able to discern which compo-
nents of a computer program should be protected as literal text
and which should be protected more abstractly as structure, it
will be impossible to apply a meaningful method of comparison
to each to determine substantial similarity.
Of the five factors that Dr. Davis evaluated for their im-
portance in assessing substantial similarity, four are defined in
the Second Circuit opinion without noting whether each is a
literal or nonliteral component of software."' The three most
important factors, according to Dr. Davis, are the code, the
parameter lists and the macros of the program. These are not,
however, nonliteral aspects of computer software. All three are
literally specified by the code of the program and, in fact, pa-
rameter lists and macros are simply segments of code."' It is
.. For further criticism of the court's analysis of Dr. Davis' table of importance,
see Bruce G. Joseph, Compilations and Computers, in ADVANCED SEMINARS ON
COPYRIGHT LAW 1992, at 113 (PLI Pat., Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop.
Course Handbook Series No. 336, 1992).
1 The court defined "code" as the embodiment of the program "in a written
language that the computer can read." Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 698. A "pa-
rameter list" is "'the information sent to and received from a subroutine.'" Id. at
697 (quoting Dr. Davis). "A macro is a single instruction that initiates a sequence
of operations or module interactions within the program." Id. at 698. An "organiza-
tion chart" or flow chart "map[s] the interactions between modules that achieve
the program's end goal." Id. at 697.
"1' For example, consider the following line of C code ("C" is a popular pro-
gramming language):
average(int x, int y)
This is the first line of code in a subroutine called "average." A subroutine is a
module of code in a program that operates on given inputs to produce a result.
Here, "average" would compute the average of two integers ("int") named "x" and
"y," which are the inputs or parameters of the subroutine. Everything inside the
parentheses (int x, int y) comprises the "parameter list" of the subroutine. For
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unclear whether the remaining two factors, the list of services
and the organization (or "flow") charts, are literal or nonliteral
elements. The court treated flow charts as nonliteral elements
although they are always depicted in some written format.
1 4
The court failed to define "list of services."
Thus, according to Dr. Davis's chart of relative importance,
the literal factors present in a computer program hold a com-
bined relative weight of 1200, while the possibly nonliteral
factors have a relative weight of one. The court's endorsement
of this weighting system for determining substantial similarity
indicates that the Second Circuit afforded protection to pro-
gram structure only as it is evidenced by the literal aspects of
software (which are 1200 times more important than non-liter-
al aspects), that is, the code itself. This finding, though only
implicit in the court's stated reasoning, transforms the rele-
vant discussion from one concerning literal and nonliteral
computer software components to a more meaningful discus-
sion of protecting literal code and literal structure.
The Second Circuit properly recognized that similarities in
program structure require a different analysis than do similar-
ities in the verbatim or near-verbatim copying of arbitrary
sections of code." 5 Copying of source code can be shown, in
the simplest situation, by comparing either source code or
object code in a line-by-line fashion to determine whether pas-
sages of instructions have been copied either wholesale or in
part." 6 As the situation becomes more complex and the liter-
al copying of code sequences are purposefully hidden or dis-
purposes of similarity, a macro is equivalent to a subroutine. The primary differ-
ence between the two lies in the manner in which the compiler translates the
source code into object code.
114 Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 702.
.. These two distinct types of similarity have been termed "fragmented literal
similarity" (verbatim or near-verbatim copying of code) and "comprehensive
nonliteral similarity" (structural similarity). 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A] (1991); see also Eric W. Petraske, An
Infringement Test for Comprehensive Similarity in Software Cases, COMPUTER LAW.,
Aug. 1990, at 12.
116 See, e.g., Customs Service Decision 90-40, 24 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 14, 28
(1990) (using a "side by side comparison" of object code and disassembled source
code to reveal verbatim copying of 60-70% of the instructions in an important
module); SAS Ins., Inc. v. S&H Computer Sys., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816, 822 (M.D.




guised by an infringing programmer, the investigation may
turn to more indirect indications of copying. For example, rep-
lication in the alleged copy of unnecessary instructions or care-
less errors in the original code may imply copying."7 Similar-
ly, an unwillingness of the allegedly infringing programmer to
take advantage of more powerful hardware resources to which
the original program had no access may evidence copying as
well."
8
Infringement in program structure requires a different
method of evidentiary analysis than infringement by verbatim
copying of code, but the evidence of copying must derive only
from the code itself. To say that structure, as applied to com-
puter software, is "nonliteral" is generally an incorrect asser-
tion. The well-worn analogy that protecting the structure of
computer programs is like protecting the nonliteral "outline" or
"plot" of a play is misguided."' Although both computer pro-
grams and plays need protection beyond strictly verbatim copy-
ing, plays (or poetry, paintings, and other artistic works) con-
vey meanings and feelings and emotions that are intangible
and unfixed; that is, the value of the work depends as much on
the audience as on the author. For this reason, the search for
the boundary at which protectible expression ends and
unprotectible idea begins has always been elusive and depends
,11 E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp., 623 F. Supp. 1485, 1495-96 (D. Minn.
1985) (three lines of unnecessary instructions appearing in the original and alleg-
edly infringing work imply verbatim copying); cf. NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., 10
U.S.P.Q.2d 1177, 1190 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (copying of a bug and its accompanying
"patch" into the microcode of an allegedly infringing microprocessor).
118 For instance, in E.F. Johnson Co., 623 F. Supp. at 1485, the plaintiffs pro-
gram used 96% of its Intel microprocessor's speed to make time-critical calcula-
tions needed to synchronize its mobile radios with remote transmission facilities.
Defendant's program, which needed to make similar calculations, used the same
calculation code as the plaintiffs program. The defendant's program, however, ran
on a much faster microprocessor and, thus, the defendant's code could have been
written to take advantage of the faster processor's speed to increase the overall
reliability and efficiency of the defendant's mobile radio. The defendants' failure to
make use of this hardware superiority "indicate[d] inferentially that [defendant's]
engineers copied the [plaintiffs] code verbatim without considering the utility
which the greater speed of the Hitachi microprocessor afforded them." Id. at 1494.
... Protecting the outline or structure of a play is the subject of Nichols v.
Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), which is often cited as the
touchstone for copyright protection of nonliteral expression: "But when the plagia-
rist does not take out a block in suit, but an abstract of the whole, decision is
more troublesome." Id. at 121.
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strongly on the facts of a given case and an audience's reaction
to them. This difficulty arises largely because an artistic
author's medium is essentially unstructured and its very pur-
pose is to convey a variety of individual interpretations to a
variety of people. Thus, the types of evidence that can be prof-
fered by plaintiffs to show substantial similarity necessarily
vary from case to case even when the same general types of
works are involved.
Computer programmers, by contrast, do not operate in the
intangible, open-ended environments that artistic authors
enjoy. Computer software is created in a tightly constrained,
highly structured medium: that of a computer language that
prescribes many rules and permits no variation or error. Com-
puter languages are not intended to convey a variety of mean-
ings. They can be interpreted in a single way: that by which
the computer sequentially executes the instructions in the
code. All results are predetermined. Nothing is left to the
whimsy of a human audience. Indeed, the Copyright Act ac-
knowledges that a computer program is "a set of statements or
instructions to be used.., in a computer in order to bring
about a certain result."20
Therefore, in evaluating similarities between structures of
computer programs, the Copyright Act directs, and program-
ming practices dictate, that the entire evidentiary investigation
be limited to the literal instructions that comprise the soft-
ware. Explorations into vague flow charts created before the
code for a program was written, comparison of simple high-
level lists of services that two programs provide or acceptance
of the copying of instruction manuals as evidence of copying
the related code, 2' .do not reveal with any certainty whether
two programs are substantially similar. Moreover, because all
computer programs are written in the same rigidly defined
environment, 2 2 the types of evidence that can show substan-
tial similarity should remain largely the same from case to
120 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1992) (emphasis added).
121 Such evidence was considered by the court in E.F. Johnson Co., 623 F.
Supp. at 1497 ("Verbatim copying of a computer manual is inferential evidence of
pirating of the underlying software.") (citing Synercom Technology v. University
Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1010 (N.D. Tex. 1978)).
12 At the very least, those programs that are written in the same language for
the same hardware are created in identical environments.
[Vol. 59: 423
PROTECTING COMPUTER SOFTWARE
case. Therefore, the goal of creating a clear methodology by
which the structures of two programs can be compared should
be achievable. Yet neither the district court nor the Second
Circuit in Computer Associates offered any specific guidelines
as to how such a method of comparison should operate.
B. The Second Circuit's Tripartite Test for Substantial
Similarity
The Second Circuit in Computer Associates endorsed a
three part substantial similarity test for program structure
based upon traditional copyright doctrines.'23 First, a court
must separate the allegedly infringed program into its struc-
tural components (the "abstraction" step). Next, uncopyright-
able elements, such as ideas, expression necessarily incident to
the ideas, and elements in the public domain are filtered from
the program (the "filtration" step). Finally, the remaining core
of protectible material is compared to the allegedly infringing
work to determine whether protected expression has been
copied to an extent sufficient to constitute infringement (the
"comparison" step).'24
Although the Second Circuit adopted a more informed
view of computer programming practice in its analysis of the
idea and expression dichotomy than have other courts, its
evidentiary analysis focused primarily on the straightforward
step of filtration instead of on the more difficult steps of ab-
straction and comparison.'25 All three steps are vital to the
analysis. Courts, therefore, will need more specific guidance to
apply the scantily outlined abstraction and comparison steps in
analyzing similarities in program structure.
1. Abstraction
The first step in the Second Circuit's substantial similarity
analysis, which is also the first step in separating ideas from
"' "This approach breaks no new ground; rather, it draws on such familiar
copyright doctrines as merger, scenes a faire, and public domain." Computer
Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992).
124 Id.
" The court's discussion of the filtration step is three times longer than its
discussion of the abstraction and comparison steps combined. Id. at 706-11.
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expression, is to "dissect the allegedly copied program's struc-
ture and isolate each level of abstraction contained within
it." 126 Thus, the court recognized that computer programs
may contain various levels of structure, ranging from the indi-
vidual instructions in the code, to low-level subroutines that
comprise the program, to larger groups of subroutines that
work together as independent modules within the program.127
The Second Circuit's acknowledgment that computer pro-
grams contain many levels of structure, though intuitive to
programmers, is an important departure from a line of cases
spawned by the widely criticized opinion in Whelan Associates
v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc.2' In Whelan the court con-
cerned itself with identifying the boundary between the
protectible expression and the unprotectible idea in a computer
program. Relying on Baker v. Selden,'29 its conclusion was
that "the purpose or function" of a computer program is the
idea, and everything in the program that "is not necessary to
that purpose or function would be part of the expression of the
idea."3 ' Thus, Whelan held that the only idea that can be
embodied in a computer program is that of the simplest, high-
est level of abstraction: the ultimate purpose of the entire pro-
gram. Application of this rule is straightforward and predict-
able, but it extends copyright protection too broadly by ignor-
ing the fact that computer programs can contain many ideas,
each embodied in only a portion of the whole program, and
126 Id. at 707.
12 See Steven R. Englund, Idea, Process, or Protected Expression?: Determining
the Scope of Copyright Protection of the Structure of Computer Programs, 88 MICH.
L. REv. 866, 897-98 (1990).
128 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); accord
Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal.
1986). For a sampling of the criticisms of the Whelan analysis, see generally
Kretschmer, supra note 2. See also Cary S. Kappel, Copyright Protection of SSO:
Replete with Internal Deficiencies and Practical Dangers, 59 FoRDHAM L. REV. 699,
707 (1991) (finding Whelan's justifications for its method of protection to be insuffi-
ciently grounded in traditional copyright law); Gregory J. Ramos, Lotus v. Paper-
back: Confusing the Idea-Expression Distinction and its Application to Computer
Software, 63 U. COLO. L. REv. 267, 274 (1992) (observing the trend of most courts
to retreat from the Whelan analysis).
2 101 U.S. 99 (1879). "Just as Baker v. Selden focused on the end sought to
be achieved by Selden's book, the line between idea and expression may be drawn
with reference to the end sought to be achieved by the work in question." Whelan,
797 F.2d at 1236.
13 Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1236.
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none of which are subject to copyright protection.
By adapting a multi-level abstractions test, the Second
Circuit successfully conformed traditional copyright doctrine to
the new technology of computer software. The court drew upon
the abstractions test as it was initially set forth by Judge
Learned Hand in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Co.13' But in-
stead of striving to determine at which particular level of ab-
straction expression ends and idea begins, the Second Circuit
modified the test to search for idea and expression at every
level of abstraction. This approach is appropriate in analyzing
computer software because unlike conventional artistic and
literary works, computer programs possess a well-defined,
identifiable hierarchy of organizational levels. In creating a
piece of software, a programmer begins by organizing concep-
tions at a high, functional level. After making conscious design
choices, the programmer moves "down" one level in the hierar-
chy, making more design decisions and organizing progressive-
ly smaller submodules to implement the module above. Each
level of this hierarchy of organizations is a structure of the
program, and each may contain ideas and expressions.
The ability to "reverse engineer " "' the programming pro-
cess to recreate the hierarchy of structures is central to the
Second Circuit's abstraction test. 3 However, courts will need
guidance in carrying out this process. Unfortunately, the Sec-
45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930); see supra note 85 and accompanying text.
' "Reverse engineering" refers to the process of ascertaining the individual
components of a system and their interaction by analyzing the finished product.
For example, a carpenter could reverse engineer a desk by disassembling the indi-
vidual parts to discover what parts were used and the pattern in which they were
assembled, resulting in a blueprint for the desk. In the software context, this
involves disassembling the object code of a program into human-readable source
code, which can be further analyzed to determine the patterns in which separable
modules of the source code, performing different functions, interact. This assembly
of program modules is one level of program structure.
Reverse engineering as an industry practice poses a threat to copyright pro-
tection that can be combated with other forms of intellectual property protection.
See Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1521 (9th Cir. 1992) (endorsing
reverse engineering as a "fair use" of a copyrighted work under some circumstanc-
es); see also Philip J. McCabe, Decision Time on Technology's Frontier, THE RE-
CORDER, Nov. 4, 1992, at 7 (discussing alternative forms of protection against
reverse engineering).
1" The court likened the abstraction process to "reverse engineering on a theo-




ond Circuit was less than generous in giving specific instruc-
tions on how this is to be accomplished. The court emphasized
the important requirement that "[tihis process begins with the
code," '134 but offered no insight other than an implicit en-
dorsement of Dr. Davis's table of "similarity factors" and their
relative importance.
2. Filtration
The second step in the Second Circuit's test is to examine
the structural components found at each level of abstraction
indicated in the first step, and to determine whether they con-
stitute an "idea," were taken from the public domain or were
included for reasons of efficiency or factors external to the
program, and are thus not protectible."1 5 As the court noted,
this step defines "the scope of the plaintiffs copyright."36 The
remaining structural components constitute a core of
protectible expression 37 and may be submitted to the com-
parison described in the third step of the test. Unlike the ab-
straction and comparison steps of the Second Circuit's substan-
tial similarity test, the court gave rather specific instructions
concerning the types of elements that must be filtered from
each level of abstraction in the effort to separate ideas from
protectible expression.
First, structural elements dictated by efficiency must be
filtered from each level of structural abstraction."'8 This is
perhaps the court's most important instruction because it sen-
sibly corrects any misconceptions concerning the use of the
merger doctrine in the computer software context. Under the
general doctrine of merger, when there is only one way to
express a particular idea, the idea and its expression are con-
sidered inseparable. The expression is said to have "merged"
with the idea and is thus not protected by copyright.139 The
134 Id.
135 Id.
... Id. (quoting Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1475
(9th Cir. 1992)).
"' See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 115, at § 13.03[FI[5].
.3 Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 707-09.




Whelan court had interpreted this to mean that where there
are "various" ways of expressing the idea, the particular ex-
pression chosen is "not necessary to the purpose" and thus has
not merged with the idea.14° Hence, so long as there are "var-
ious" ways of expressing an idea, a particular expression will
be protectible."4' Whelan qualified this finding by stating that
where "there are only a very limited number" of structures
available to accomplish the task, there may necessarily be
little variation between even independently created works and
therefore copyright should not protect such structures."'
The Second Circuit took this analysis an important step
further by holding that even where there are various struc-
tures available for accomplishing a certain task, structures
which are chosen because they are efficient are not copyright-
able. An important goal of both the software industry and
copyright law is to distribute better software to users. The
Second Circuit recognized that evidence of similar efficient
structure therefore may lead to an inference of independent
creation as likely as it would to an inference of copying.'
Hence, the evidence is not probative of copying and should be
dismissed or "filtered" from the analysis. The court also noted
that two types of efficient structure are unprotected: that
which causes a program to run more efficiently within a com-
puter, and that which allows a user to make more efficient use
of a computer.'" This is a substantial and appropriate bar to
.4. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1236 (3d
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987). The Second Circuit formulated the
general application of merger to computer software as an inquiry into "'whether
the use of this particular set of modules is necessary efficiently to implement that
part of the program's process' being implemented. If the answer is yes, then the
expression represented by the programmer's choice of a specific module or group of
modules has merged with their underlying idea and is unprotected." Computer
Assocs., 982 F.2d at 708 (citing Englund, supra note 127, at 902-03).
141 Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1236.
142 Id. at 1243 n.43.
1 Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 708.
. Other courts have previously extended the merger doctrine to structures
accommodating user efficiency. See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software
Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 66 (D. Mass. 1990) (the expression of which key on a key-
board should be used to invoke a command system merged with the underlying
idea since the key "must be easily accessible"); Manufacturers Technologies, Inc. v.
Cams, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984, 995-99 (D. Conn. 1989) (expression of a method of
allowing a user to navigate between screen displays not protectible since there
were a limited number of methods that would "facilitate user comfort").
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copyright protection which allows independent creators to feel
unencumbered by the law in their efforts to make computer
software more efficient and more usable.
The second category of items that must be filtered are
elements dictated by external factors. 145 This is simply an ap-
preciation that the computer programming environment is nec-
essarily constrained by the hardware and other programs with
which the software will interact, as well as by the demands of
the industry or customers that the software will support.'46
Additionally, programmers tend to conform their work to stan-
dards set by computer manufacturers and to widely accepted
industry programming practices. Because programmers have
little or no choice in these areas, structural similarities dictat-
ed by these factors are not probative of copying and must also
be filtered from the substantial similarity analysis.
The third and simplest category of filtered elements are
those in the public domain. By definition, material in the pub-
lic domain may be taken without remuneration and an
author's inclusion of the material in a copyrighted work does
not remove it from free, public access. 4' The Second Circuit
found no reason to alter this rule for computer software, and
noted that programming practices that are "commonplace in
the computer software industry" may fall within this category
as well as within the category of elements dictated by external
factors. 148
The Second Circuit's application of the filtration step to
the facts of Computer Associates was minimal. The court mere-
ly agreed with the district court judge's finding that almost all
similarities between the parameter lists and macros in OSCAR
and ADAPTER were due to the "functional demands of the
program" (external factors) or to their being in the public do-
14 Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 709.
146 Id.; see also Plains Cotton Coop. v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., 807 F.2d
1256, 1262 (5th Cir.) (finding that factors in the cotton market played "a signifi-
cant role" in determining the structure of cotton marketing software), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 821 (1987).
147 See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir.) (not-
ing that even where a prior, unprotected work is independently created by another
author, the public is still free to copy from the prior work), cert. denied, 298 U.S.
669 (1936).
14 Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 710 (citing Brown Bag Software v. Symantec
Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1473 (9th Cir. 1992)).
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main.' Further, similarities in the two programs' lists of
services were also dictated by external factors: the demands of
the operating system to which the programs were linked.15
The district court opinion did not provide any more informa-
tion concerning the specific application of the filtration process
to the evidence in the case than did the Second Circuit opinion.
Again, the opportunity to guide evidentiary analysis was lost.
3. Comparison
The final step in the Second Circuit's substantial similari-
ty inquiry involves a comparison between the plaintiffs ab-
stracted, filtered program and the allegedly infringing pro-
gram.151 The court's guidance here was slimmest of all. The
single focus was on whether the defendant had copied any of
the plaintiffs protected expression (i.e., the remaining "core" of
material following abstraction and filtration). The court only
vaguely noted that an "assessment of the copied portion's rela-
tive importance with respect to the plaintiffs overall program"
must also be undertaken.'52 But the only elaboration as to
the manner in which this assessment relates to the analysis
was in a de minimis exception by which the court noted that a
"few" similarities may not give rise to an infringement given
the minor "relative contribution [of the similar entities] to the
overall program."'5 '
This step of the court's analysis is the most troublesome.
The court failed to define what types of evidence are to be
compared and, more crucially, how they are to be compared.
Are there constructs in source code that, when similar, are
more indicative of structural copying than others? What are
they? How are they to be weighted? How much variance can
exist between two structures that are "similar" in a legal
sense? What is the threshold for the de minimis exception?
These questions were neither asked nor answered in either the
district court or Second Circuit Computer Associates opinions,
... Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 714.
1 Id.
... Id. at 710-11.
'.. Id. at 710.
'' Id. at 714-15 (citing Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 720 F.2d
231, 242 (2d Cir. 1983)).
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yet they must be asked and answered by each trial judge who
faces a software copyright case in the future. A solid body of
evidentiary precedent must be created to guide judges through
these heavily technical software cases. Of course, such an enti-
ty cannot be intelligently created without the consultation of
those most familiar with the subject: experts in software de-
sign and creation.
C. The Proper Use of Expert Testimony
Under traditional copyright law, the lay observer deter-
mined whether the work of one author infringed upon the
copyrighted work of another.154 The lay observer was an ap-
propriate fact-finder when the subject matter of most copy-
rights consisted of artistic works intended for, and comprehen-
sible by, the general public.
With the advent of copyright in utilitarian works, copy-
rights were issued for works that were intended not for the
general public, but for a specific audience.155 The public-at-
large no longer possessed the specialized knowledge necessary
to understand and recognize unauthorized and illicit copying of
these works. Consequently, in cases of complex subject matter,
some courts have modified the lay observer test to make the
finder of fact the intended observer: an individual familiar
with the subject matter by being a member of the audience
that the author intended to reach. 56 In the context of com-
puter copyright cases, an expert witness either becomes the in-
tended observer or renders significant testimony to guide the
ordinary observer.57
Computer software is unintelligible to most of the public,
and most judges also have no special computer training. Thus,
experts in the fields of computer engineering and computer
15 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S.
851 (1947).
" Such works intended for a specific audience have included, for example, led-
ger forms for accountants, or musical works of a specific genre.
1.6 See Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 737 (4th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 498 U.S. 981 (1990).
... See generally Robert G. Sugarman, The Use of Experts and Survey Evidence
in Copyright, Trademark and Unfair Competition Litigation, in LITIGATING COPY-
RIGHT, TRADEMARK, AND UNFAIR COMPETITION CASES 1992, at 301 (PLI Pat., Copy-
rights, Trademarks & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 351, 1992).
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science are nearly always retained at some point during com-
puter litigation to familiarize the court and, if present, the jury
with at least basic concepts. Federal Rule of Evidence 706
permits a court to appoint an expert witness upon its own
motion or that of a party. ' The question is at what point
may expert testimony be used, by whom and to what extent.
The district court in Computer Associates appointed its
own expert witness in addition to considering testimony by the
expert witnesses retained by both parties "because of the ex-
tensive technical evidence and expert testimony anticipated
from both sides."'5 9 Dr. Randall Davis of the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology gave extensive testimony on the cre-
ation of computer software, how software controls computer
hardware, and his opinions on the similarity of the two pro-
grams at issue."'
On appeal, Computer Associates claimed that "the district
court erred by relying too heavily on the court appointed
expert's 'personal opinions on the factual and legal issues be-
fore the court."""' In fact, the district court opinion quotes
extensively from Dr. Davis's testimony and consistently adopts
Dr. Davis's reasoning as its own. In its substantial similarity
inquiry alone, the court either quotes or paraphrases Dr.
Davis's opinions at least sixteen times. The court praised Dr.
Davis's "convincingly demonstrated" arguments on the flaws in
the Whelan case,'62 allowed Dr. Davis to "invite[] further evi-
dence from the parties' experts"6 3 and frequently drew con-
clusions of fact from Dr. Davis's opinions without further in-
quiry or analysis." These actions suggest that Dr. Davis did
'" Rule 706(a) provides:
Appointment.-The court may on its own motion or on the motion of any
party enter an order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be
appointed, and may request the parties to submit nominations. The court
may appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon by the parties, and may
appoint expert witnesses of its own selection ....
FED. R. EVID. 706(a).
Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544, 549 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
,c Id. at 549-51, 558-62.
IGI Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 712 (2d Cir. 1992).
IC2 Computer Assocs., 775 F. Supp. at 559.
' Id. at 561-62.
" For example, without further elaboration, the court found that "the rewriting
process [of OSCAR 3.4 to OSCAR 3.5] was, as Dr. Davis testified, a reasonable
method." Id. at 562 (emphasis added).
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not merely assist the trier of fact; he, in fact, became the trier
of fact.165
The Second Circuit reviewed the evolving law on the sub-
ject of expert testimony in cases of copyrights on complex sub-
ject matter and held that the extent to which expert testimony
may be used by the fact-finder in a case involving computer
programs is wholly within the discretion of the district
court.'66 Noting that "Dr. Davis' opinion was instrumental in
dismantling the intricacies of computer science," the court
concluded that the district court "remained, in the final analy-
sis, the trier of fact" despite its heavy reliance on the ex-
pert."7 With all of Dr. Davis's expert testimony thus admissi-
ble, the Second Circuit agreed with the district court that the
few elements in the two programs that might be construed as
being copied "did not warrant a finding of infringement given
their relative contribution to the overall program.""s The es-
timation of these elements' relative contribution came from a
quantitative evaluation by the expert, Dr. Davis. 6' Thus, the
Second Circuit endorsed the use of expert testimony in both
the extrinsic and intrinsic prongs of the substantial similarity
inquiry.'
70
Combining the traditional two-prong substantial similarity
inquiry into a single test uniformly admitting expert testimony
is a growing trend in computer copyright cases.'17  Some
courts prefer to maintain the theoretical distinction between
the two tests, but arrive at the same result. In this approach,
1" Victoria Slind-Flor, Tackling High Tech, NATL. L.J., Oct. 19, 1992, at 1
("Professor Davis wrote a 60-page paper on software technology that so impressed
Judge Pratt, and the Second Circuit panel that handled the case's appeal, that
rulings from both courts quoted the report extensively.").
" Computer Assocs. Intn'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 712-14 (2d Cir. 1992).
Curiously, the court quoted Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab. Inc., 797 F.2d
1222, 1233 (3d Cir. 1986): "an integrated test involving expert testimony and ana-
lytic dissection may well be the wave of the future in this area."
" Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 714.
i Id. at 714-15; see also Computer Assocs., 775 F. Supp. at 562.
165 Id. at 562.
171 See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
... See Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1474 n.3 (9th
Cir. 1992) (endorsing a test "in which lay and expert testimony are uniformly
admissible" in cases of computer copyright); Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1233 (We . ..
adopt a single substantial similarity inquiry according to which both lay and ex-
pert testimony would be admissible."); supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
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the "lay observer" fact-finder in the intrinsic prong is instead
replaced by the "ordinary reasonable person" who, in computer
cases, is a computer programmer. Consequently, the court
retains an expert computer programmer to give testimony
about the intrinsic prong of the test as well.172
Replacing the lay observer with experts in all phases of
the substantial similarity inquiry is procedurally necessary,
but, at the same time, inherently dangerous. Without the
knowledge and experience of experts, the lay fact-finder would
drown helplessly in the apparent gibberish of symbols and
phrases that comprises computer software. Few computer ex-
perts, however-even those appointed by the court with the
consent of all parties, like Dr. Davis-are wholly unbiased as
to what degree software merits protection by copyright law or
other legal doctrines. In fact, Dr. Davis's report for the Com-
puter Associates court suggests that he believed that the trend
at the time of the litigation to grant liberal copyright protec-
tion to software needed to be reexamined.'73 Whether Dr.
Davis's opinion is meritorious is only secondarily important.
The primary concern is that the political opinion of one expert,
which influenced a report relied upon heavily by a court re-
questing it, may have determined the outcome of this case.
The potential for this situation to arise in any software
case (assuming that all such cases will necessitate the use of
experts) places a judge in the unhappy position of both playing
fact-finder and policing the experts. A judge must and should
seek the opinions of several experts to determine what factors
are relevant in the substantial similarity analysis and in what
quanta they are present in the case at hand. At the same time,
a judge must at all times be leery of three activities that could
172 See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 844 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
173 Davis, supra note 86, at 314 (criticizing the decision in Whelan, the then-
leading case concerning copyright protection for nonliteral software elements); see
also COMPUTER SCIENCE & TELECOMBIUNICATIONS BOARD, NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES IN SOFTWARE 12-13 (National Academy
Press, 1991) (quoting Professor Randall Davis: "We need to think again and we
need to be willing to question some of the most fundamental assumptions of intel-
lectual property law."). For a general criticism of the court's use of expert testimo-
ny in the Computer Associates cases, see Anthony L. Clapes & Jennifer M.
Daniels, Revenge of the Luddites: A Closer Look at Computer Associates v. Altai,
COMPUTER LAW., Nov. 1992, at 11.
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render a judgment inequitable: (1) as in all cases, experts must
not be biased by an alliance to one of the parties to the suit;
(2) especially in the multi-billion dollar international software
industry, experts must not be biased by their own political
agendas or those of organizations to which they belong; and (3)
a judge must, in the end, remain the sole trier of fact. The
Computer Associates decision may, as some have suggested,
have suffered from a district court judge who, perhaps without
any alternative, ceded his fact-finding authority to a single
expert with preconceived opinions as to software copyright law
policy and its application. 4 Without conscientious eviden-
tiary investigation by judges and thorough evaluation of the
opinions, motivations and credentials of several experts, uni-
form and equitable decisions in software copyright cases will
remain woefully sporadic.
D. The Need for Further Guidance
Because the Second Circuit's substantial similarity test is
so unfamiliar and counter-intuitive,, judges require access to
citable precedent that contains relatively detailed discussion of
the test's application to specifically illustrated programs. Such
a body of law will familiarize judges (as well as lawyers) with
computer software and will help develop unified standards of
applying the three-part test. Most people, however, are unable
to understand source code, and the background necessary to
acquire such an understanding is obviously beyond the scope of
a judicial opinion. Thus, an analysis of the programs at issue
in each case must be presented in an intelligible format.
One possible method for presenting software in a useful
manner is in a text-diagram appendix which can be referred to
in the text of an opinion as necessary. In the first section, a
relevant sample of complimentary code from the plaintiffs and
defendant's software should be presented in full. This would
allow a side-by-side comparison to determine initially whether
identical similarity is present. In the second section, a diagram
should be depicted showing the relation of various functional
components of the plaintiffs program to one another and to the
higher-level purposes of the program. Descriptions of such
14 Clapes & Daniels, supra note 173, at 11.
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components may be in plain English and, when properly ar-
ranged, pictorially represent the result of the court's "abstrac-
tion" step. The third section should show both the source code
and the diagram of the plaintiffs program after deleting the
elements eliminated by the "filtration" step. Finally, the source
code and a component-relation diagram (similar to that in the
second section) of the defendant's program must be presented
to aid in appreciating the "comparison" step of the court's anal-
ysis.
The usefulness of the information provided in such an
appendix cannot be gainsaid. Although abstract in form, func-
tional diagrams of the software at issue will enable many more
readers to comprehend and analyze the opinion and apply its
reasoning to a later case. Further, by juxtaposing diagrams
and the related source code, readers will be better able to ap-
preciate the difficulties and constraints that programmers face
in implementing particular functions. Moreover, the infusion of
actual source code into judicial opinions will at last yield clues
to the quantum and quality of evidence necessary to sustain a
finding of substantial similarity. Finally, the guidance provided
by the presentation of such evidence in judicial opinions will
alleviate much of the intimidation caused by the subject mat-
ter of these cases.
There is, of course, one countervailing consideration relat-
ing to the presentation of the source code in a case: it may also
be protected as a trade secret. A party who has developed
software in secrecy from competitors may be averse to divulg-
ing it in a legal opinion. But computer software evolves rapid-
ly. Programs that may be valuable to a software company
today might become obsolete to its users and, thus, valueless
to the company tomorrow. In the protracted context of litiga-
tion, a party to a copyright action may well find that its soft-
ware has become useless or obvious by the time a decision in
the case is ready for publication. Hence, such a party may be
willing to release a relevant portion of the source code for pub-
lication in an opinion. Given that predictable, consistent copy-
right laws are in the interest of all authors of software, the




With a national industry at stake, courts, or perhaps Con-
gress, must quickly come to grips with the difficulties inherent
in the protection of computer intellectual property. It is no
longer sufficient to hide unfamiliarity with the complex subject
matter of computer software in broad theoretical diatribes that
somehow attempt to strain a fluid, dynamic technology into the
rigorous traditional definitions of copyright doctrine.
The Second Circuit has made a significant theoretical
contribution to copyright law with its tripartite test for sub-
stantial similarity in computer programs. Yet, the Second
Circuit has done nothing to clarify the application of the test,
or to show the court's own ability to apply the test to the facts
of the case that brought it about. Further, the Second Circuit
has endorsed blind reliance on a single expert for both factual
analysis doctrinal creation. To avoid these pitfalls to an other-
wise useful analytic framework, district court judges must now
strive to become comfortable talking and writing about soft-
ware and must implement procedures to ensure that expert
testimony is unbiased and that its evaluation is competent.
Andrew G. Isztwan
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